Software Comes Second: Performative Technologies, Embodied Agents and Situated Machines
Symposium:
- ISEA2011: 17th International Symposium on Electronic Art
- More presentations from ISEA2011:
Session Title:
- Signs of Life: Human-Robot Intersubjectivities
Presentation Title:
- Software Comes Second: Performative Technologies, Embodied Agents and Situated Machines
Presenter(s):
Venue(s):
Abstract:
Panel: Signs of Life: Human-Robot Intersubjectivities
The historical association of robotics with computing and Artificial Intelligence has led, in the popular imagination and in the minds of many artist-researchers, to the assumption that a robot must have a computer ‘brain’ and a software ‘mind’ which control ‘dumb’ sensors and effectors. Such assumptions subscribe to a neocartesianism which is contradicted by studies of biological organisms and embodied cognition and mitigates against the successful construction of persuasive autonomous aesthetic agents. Contrary to a computationalist and software-centric methodology, the argument of this paper is that in order to achieve successful design of persuasive experience in such systems, software design must be the end-result of an inward movement of attention from a conception of the cultural and experiential world of the intended audience which defines material aspects and code. This paper proposes that the ‘traditional’ artistic sensibilities of sculpture, installation and performance have much of value to contribute to such projects because they are centrally concerned with the subtle manipulations of materiality, artifact, space and gesture for generating sensorially rich experience.
The broad field of robotic art encompasses a spectrum from minimal sensori-motor function analogous to single celled organisms, those modeled on animal behavior, all the way to systems which conduct conversations. The question of intersubjectivity is relevant in the latter, as an aesthetic variable manipulated by the artist for particular effect. The artist engineers a sense of intersubjectivity in order to evoke the uncanny. To what extent it is necessary to endorse a vision of machine sentience in such work? Some subscribe to a covert mystical extropianism, while the more pragmatic endorse a position of adequate verisimilitude for suspension of disbelief. Such critiques can inform a grounded discussion of robotic art along two axes: the condition of a machine which emulates the biological (in various ways) and: the status of robotic devices as aesthetic actors in embodied interactive contexts. This discussion will offer historical examples and draw upon cybernetic, biological and aesthetic theory.